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CUSTOM AND THE RULE OF LAW IN THE 
ADMINISTRATION OF THE INCOME TAX 
LAWRENCE ZELENAK† 
ABSTRACT 
  From the early years of the federal income tax to the present, the 
Internal Revenue Service (IRS) has engaged in what might be termed 
“customary deviations” from the dictates of the Internal Revenue 
Code, always in a taxpayer-favorable direction. A prominent current 
example is the IRS’s “don’t ask, don’t tell” policy with respect to 
employee-retained frequent flier miles; in a 2002 announcement 
(which, as of 2012, is still in force), the IRS indicated that such miles 
were technically within the scope of the statutory definition of gross 
income, but that the IRS had no intention of enforcing the law. This 
Essay describes and evaluates the phenomenon of administratively-
created customary deviations from the Code. After defining the 
concept of customary deviations and explaining why such deviations 
are sometimes attractive to tax administrators, the Essay offers a brief 
historical survey of customary deviations, paying particular attention 
to the pre-1984 treatment of a miscellany of fringe benefits of 
employment, and to a spate of recent announcements that the IRS 
would not enforce the Code’s anti-loss-trafficking rules in certain 
contexts. The Essay also explains how the development of customary 
deviations has depended on the absence of third-party standing in tax 
litigation, and how the lack of any judicial check on unauthorized 
giveaways by tax administrators threatens rule-of-law values. It 
concludes with a proposal for legislation aimed at retaining the 
practical advantages of customary deviations while assuaging rule-of-
law concerns. 
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INTRODUCTION 
A recurring theme in discussions of the relationship between 
custom and the law is the tension between the practical advantages of 
custom and the threat custom may pose to rule-of-law values.1 This 
Essay considers how that tension has played out over almost a 
century of administration of the federal income tax. It begins with a 
prominent example of the conflict between tax law and custom. 
The attorneys in the Chief Counsel’s Office of the Internal 
Revenue Service’s (IRS) who are charged with writing private letter 
rulings and other forms of unpublished guidance usually labor in 
obscurity—but not when the taxation of frequent-flier miles is at 
issue. A story published in the Wall Street Journal on November 28, 
1995, explained that an IRS technical advice memorandum (TAM)2—
which had been issued months earlier without attracting any interest 
from the media—implied that business travelers had taxable income 
when they were allowed to retain for personal use frequent-flier miles 
generated by air travel paid for by their employers.3 According to the 
Wall Street Journal, a “storm of protest [was] gathering” over the 
implication of the TAM.4 In a remarkably quick response, on the 
same day the story appeared in the Wall Street Journal an IRS “senior 
 
 1. For a classic statement of the tension between custom and the rule of law, see generally 
Stanley Diamond, The Rule of Law Versus the Order of Custom, 38 SOC. RES. 42 (1971). The 
tension identified by Professor Diamond, however, is somewhat different from the tension 
discussed in this Essay. In Diamond’s view, “[c]ustom . . . is the modality of primitive society; 
law is the instrument of civilization, of political society sanctioned by organized force.” Id. at 47. 
 2. I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem. 95-47-001 (July 11, 1995). 
 3. Tom Herman, Frequent-Flier Miles May Become IRS Target, WALL ST. J., Nov. 28, 
1995, at A3.  
 4. Id. 
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spokesman” told the New York Times, “We have no particular 
compliance activities geared toward the taxation of frequent flier 
miles and we don’t anticipate any . . . . I want to make sure that 
people don’t overreact.”5 With the storm of protest averted, taxpayers 
and their employers continued not to report the value of employee-
retained frequent-flier miles on Forms W-2 and 1040, and the IRS 
continued to look the other way.6 All remained quiet on the frequent-
flier tax front until 2002, when the IRS bestirred itself to issue an 
announcement affirming the status quo: 
There are numerous technical and administrative issues relating to 
these benefits on which no official guidance has been provided, 
including issues relating to the timing and valuation of income 
inclusions and the basis for identifying personal use benefits 
attributable to business (or official) expenditures versus those 
attributable to personal expenditures. Because of these unresolved 
issues, the IRS has not pursued a tax enforcement program with 
respect to promotional benefits such as frequent flyer miles. 
  Consistent with prior practice, the IRS will not assert that any 
taxpayer has understated his federal tax liability by reason of the 
receipt or personal use of frequent flyer miles or other in-kind 
promotional benefits attributable to the taxpayer’s business or 
official travel. Any future guidance on the taxability of these 
benefits will be applied prospectively.7 
Ten years later no “future guidance” has appeared, and the de facto 
tax-exempt status of employee-retained frequent-flier miles remains 
intact.8 
 
 5. Robert D. Hershey, Jr., IRS Backs Down on Frequent-Flier Miles, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 28, 
1995, at B14 (quoting Frank Keith) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 6. Darrell L. Oliveira, The Taxability of Frequent Flyer Credits Earned by Employees: 
Why the IRS Has Remained Silent on the Issue, 4 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 643, 643–44 (2002) 
(describing continued IRS inaction through 2002). 
 7. I.R.S. Announcement 2002-18, 2002-10 I.R.B. 621. 
 8. The tax status of frequent-flier miles resurfaced early in 2012, in a nonemployment 
context, when the Los Angeles Times reported that Citibank had issued Forms 1099-MISC to 
persons to whom it had given frequent-flier miles as rewards for opening accounts. David 
Lazarus, Tax Man Leaves Fliers up in the Air, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 24, 2012, at B1. Citibank 
apparently concluded—reasonably enough—that Announcement 2002-18, 2002-10 I.R.B. 621, 
did not cover this situation because it discussed only “promotional benefits attributable to the 
taxpayer’s business or official travel,” id. In response to a reporter’s question, an IRS 
spokesperson, Michelle Eldridge, commented, “When frequent-flier miles are provided as a 
premium for opening a financial account, it can be a taxable situation subject to reporting under 
current law.” David Lazarus, Taxing Airline Miles Flies in the Face of Reason, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 
31, 2012, at B1 (quoting Michelle Eldridge) (internal quotation marks omitted). It does not 
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Despite the reference to questions of timing and valuation, 
nothing in the 2002 announcement suggests any reason why such 
benefits would not be included (at some time and in some amount) 
within the scope of the statutory definition of “gross income” as 
including “all income from whatever source derived.”9 Moreover, the 
announcement does not suggest that frequent-flier miles would fit 
within any statutory exclusion from gross income. To the contrary, 
the announcement appears to assume the statutory taxability of 
employee-retained frequent-flier miles, and the vast majority of 
commentators have agreed with that assumption.10 For reasons of 
administrative convenience—to avoid the timing and valuation 
problems referred to in the 2002 announcement—the IRS has 
decided to create a de facto, or customary, gross income exclusion, 
despite the absence of any statutory authority for its position. 
This Essay describes and evaluates the phenomenon of 
administratively created customary deviations from the dictates of the 
Internal Revenue Code. Part I defines the concept of customary 
deviations, distinguishes it from several other phenomena of tax 
administration (including mere underenforcement of the law and 
dubious protaxpayer administrative interpretations of the Code), and 
explains why customary deviations are sometimes attractive to the 
Treasury and the IRS. Part II offers a brief historical survey of 
customary deviations, paying particular attention to the pre-1984 
treatment of a miscellany of fringe benefits of employment, and to a 
spate of recent announcements that the IRS would not enforce the 
anti-loss-trafficking rules11 in certain contexts. Part III explains how 
 
appear, however, that the IRS is making any attempt to enforce the taxability of such premium 
miles against customers of other (non-1099-issuing) banks. See id. (quoting an IRS 
spokesperson, who noted that the taxability of benefits, such as frequent-flier miles, “depends 
on the nature, value, and other facts and circumstances surrounding the particular incentive” 
(quoting Eldridge) (internal quotation mark omitted)).  
 9. I.R.C. § 61(a) (2006). 
 10. See, e.g., Joseph M. Dodge, How To Tax Frequent Flyer Bonuses, 48 TAX NOTES 1301, 
1302 (1990) (“This situation falls squarely under the expanded ‘inconsistent events’ formulation 
of the ‘tax benefit rule’ as formulated by the Supreme Court . . . .” (quoting Hillsboro Nat’l 
Bank v. Comm’r, 460 U.S. 370, 386–87 (1983))); Jonathan Barry Forman, Income Tax 
Consequences of Frequent Flyer Programs, 26 TAX NOTES 742, 743–44 (1985) (arguing that 
frequent-flier benefits are fringe benefits and are unlikely to be excluded as a “working 
condition fringe”); Oliveira, supra note 6, at 646–47 (noting that retained frequent-flier miles 
represent “a clear accession to wealth and would therefore appear taxable”); Lee A. Sheppard, 
Collecting the Tax on Frequent Flyer Benefits, 59 TAX NOTES 1140, 1141 (1993) (describing a 
frequent-flier benefit as a “fringe benefit taxable as compensation”). 
 11. See generally I.R.C. § 382 (Supp. IV 2011) (setting forth the anti-loss-trafficking rules). 
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the development of customary deviations has depended on the 
absence of third-party standing in tax litigation and how the lack of 
any judicial check on unauthorized giveaways by tax administrators 
threatens rule-of-law values. It also proposes legislation aimed at 
retaining the practical advantages of customary deviations while 
assuaging rule-of-law concerns. 
I.  THE WHAT AND WHY OF CUSTOMARY DEVIATIONS 
As the term is used here, a customary deviation is an established 
practice of the tax administrators (the IRS and the Treasury 
Department) that deviates from the clear dictates of the Internal 
Revenue Code. Customary deviations are always protaxpayer for the 
simple reason that taxpayers could and would successfully challenge 
in court any administrative attempt to deviate from the statute in an 
antitaxpayer direction. Being well aware of this fact, the tax 
administrators have demonstrated no interest in antitaxpayer 
deviations. Sometimes no official pronouncement of any sort 
discloses the existence of a customary deviation, as in the case of the 
nontaxation of frequent-flier miles prior to the 1995 dustup. In other 
cases, the IRS—generally after finding itself in a tight spot, sometimes 
as a result of its own bungling—sends out a spokesperson or issues an 
announcement to explain, quite frankly, that the IRS has no intention 
of enforcing some aspect of the law. This is exemplified by the 1995 
remarks of a “senior spokesman”12 and the 2002 formal 
announcement, both relating to frequent-flier miles. In still other 
cases, the IRS issues a revenue ruling baldly stating, without any 
explanation or analysis, that the statute does not say what it clearly 
says. For example, a 1957 revenue ruling states, with no explanation 
whatsoever and in conflict with the doctrine of constructive receipt, 
that a game-show contestant who turns down an in-kind prize does 
not have to include the value of the prize in gross income.13 
Customary deviations are distinct (albeit with some fuzziness 
around the edges of the distinctions) from three other phenomena. 
The first is a protaxpayer interpretation of the Code that may seem 
dubious or even insupportable in terms of the literal language of the 
Code, but which would almost certainly be adopted by the courts if 
the IRS were to reverse its position and taxpayers were to challenge 
 
 12. Hershey, supra note 5. 
 13. Rev. Rul. 57-374, 1957-2 C.B. 69; see also infra text accompanying note 36. 
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the new IRS position. For example, the sweeping language of I.R.C. 
§ 61—“gross income means all income from whatever source 
derived”14—provides no foundation for the exclusion from gross 
income of imputed income from services (that is, the value of services 
one performs for oneself) and from property (that is, the rental value 
of owner-occupied housing and consumer durables). The exclusion of 
such benefits dates from the dawn of the income tax and is so central 
to the structure of the income tax that it is inconceivable that the 
courts would support an administrative effort to reverse that 
exclusion.15 In contrast, the administrative exclusion of frequent-flier 
miles is of relatively recent vintage and is not central to the structure 
of the income tax. As a result, it is very likely that the courts would 
support an IRS effort to tax employee-retained frequent-flier miles, 
were the IRS to have a change of heart on this issue.16 No doubt there 
are some borderline practices that could arguably be grouped either 
with imputed income or with frequent-flier miles, but in most cases 
the distinction is reasonably clear. 
The second phenomenon is simple underenforcement of the law 
without any indication (beyond the mere underenforcement) that the 
IRS acquiesces in widespread noncompliance with the Code. For 
example, an information-reporting provision of the Code results in 
tipped restaurant employees generally reporting income equal to 8 
percent of restaurant sales.17 For the most part, the IRS is content to 
enforce the income tax on the tips subject to information reporting, 
without making a serious effort with respect to the other half (roughly 
speaking) of actual tip income.18 Despite this underenforcement, the 
 
 14. I.R.C. § 61(a) (2006). 
 15. BORIS I. BITTKER, MARTIN J. MCMAHON, JR. & LAWRENCE A. ZELENAK, FEDERAL 
INCOME TAXATION OF INDIVIDUALS ¶ 3.03[1] (3d ed. 2002) (“These items are not exempted 
from tax by specific statutory provisions, but congressional silence on the subject is clearly 
tantamount to an affirmative grant of immunity.”). 
 16. For consideration of the possibility that what begins as a customary deviation may 
acquire the force of law over time, see infra notes 37–45 and accompanying text. 
 17. See I.R.C. § 6053(a), (c)(3)(A), (c)(4) (2006) (providing that a food or beverage 
establishment employing more than ten employees on a typical business day must, if the tipping 
of employees is “customary,” allocate among employees who customarily receive tips “an 
amount equal to the excess of—(i) 8 percent of the gross receipts . . . over (ii) the aggregate 
amount [of tip receipts] reported by such employees to the employer”). 
 18. See United States v. Fior d’Italia, Inc., 536 U.S. 238, 240 (2002) (upholding the IRS 
practice of assessing FICA taxes owed by a restaurant on tips unreported by its employees, 
based on an estimate of aggregate tips received by all employees of the restaurant, without any 
attempt by the IRS to assess income taxes against individual employees with unreported tip 
income).  
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unequivocal position of the IRS is that taxpayers have an obligation 
to report 100 percent of their actual tip income. According to the first 
page of the IRS publication Reporting Tip Income,19 “[a]ll tips you 
receive are income and are subject to federal income tax.”20 This is, of 
course, very different from the IRS’s announcement that it “will not 
assert that any taxpayer has understated his federal tax liability by 
reason of the receipt or personal use of frequent flyer miles,”21 and 
from its conclusion in a revenue ruling that turned-down game-show 
prizes are not includible in gross income.22 
Finally, customary deviations are distinct from mere dubious 
protaxpayer interpretations of the Code by the Treasury Department 
or the IRS. A dubious protaxpayer interpretation at least pays lip 
service—and sometimes considerably more than lip service—to the 
law on the books and purports to apply that law. As an example, 
consider proposed regulations issued in 1992, which would have 
extended the exclusion of I.R.C. § 101(a) for life-insurance proceeds 
“paid by reason of the death of the insured” to “qualified accelerated 
death benefits” that are paid by an insurer to a terminally ill insured 
within twelve months of the expected death of the insured.23 Although 
a prominent commentator sharply criticized the proposed regulations 
as irreconcilable with the statutory language,24 the IRS Commissioner 
at the time the proposed regulations were issued defended them as a 
legitimate reading of the statute.25 By contrast, a customary deviation 
is characterized either by the IRS simply conceding that it has no 
intention to enforce the law (as with frequent-flier miles) or by the 
 
 19. I.R.S. Publ’n 531 (Feb. 23, 2012), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p531.pdf. 
 20. Id. at 1.  
 21. I.R.S. Announcement 2002-18, 2002-10 I.R.B. 621. 
 22. Rev. Rul. 57-374, 1957-2 C.B. 69. 
 23. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.101-8, 57 Fed. Reg. 59,319, 59,320 (Dec. 15, 1992). The proposed 
regulations were never finalized because the addition of § 101(g) to the Code in 1996 provided 
detailed statutory rules for the exclusion of accelerated death benefits. See Health Insurance 
Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-191, tit. III, subtit. D, § 331, 110 
Stat. 1936, 2067 (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 101(g) (2006)). 
 24. See Lee A. Sheppard, The Goldberg Variations, or Giving Away the Store, 58 TAX 
NOTES 530, 533 (1993) (“‘By reason of the death of the insured’ means what it says—death.” 
(quoting I.R.C. § 101(a)(1))). 
 25. See id. (“‘By reason of,’ [IRS Commissioner Fred T. Goldberg] argued, does not 
necessarily require that the death already have occurred.”); see also James P. Holden, Lee 
Sheppard’s Grumpy Attack, 58 TAX NOTES 1130, 1131 (1993) (“[T]he section 101(a) exclusion 
for payments ‘by reason of the death of the insured’ is broad enough to permit payments made 
by reason of imminent death . . . .”). 
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IRS stating without explanation—because no plausible explanation is 
available—that the statute means what it obviously does not. 
Two important commentators would disagree with this Essay’s 
claim that customary deviations are distinct from mere dubious 
protaxpayer interpretations of the statute. In a thoughtful recent 
article, Professors Alice Abreu and Richard Greenstein offer an in-
depth examination of the long-standing practice of the Treasury 
Department and the IRS of not enforcing the full sweep of the § 61(a) 
definition of gross income, as elaborated upon by the Supreme Court 
in Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co.,26 with respect to various 
sorts of in-kind benefits.27 They convincingly demonstrate that these 
failures to enforce the full sweep of the statute, rather than being 
instances of mere bureaucratic nonfeasance, are responses of 
conscientious administrators to severe practical problems—of 
valuation, liquidity, enforcement, and public understanding and 
acceptance—that would surely follow from attempted full 
enforcement.28 The focus of Professors Abreu and Greenstein is 
limited to issues relating to the definition of gross income; in contrast 
with this Essay, they do not consider other sorts of administrative 
deviations from the dictates of the Internal Revenue Code. 
Nevertheless, the overlap between the subject matter of their article 
and the subject matter of the current Essay is great, because, as 
described in Part II, most customary deviations involve in-kind 
receipts and the definition of gross income. 
The disagreement here is not with Professors Abreu and 
Greenstein’s excellent survey of the reasons administrators are drawn 
to customary deviations, but with their characterization of such 
deviations not as nonenforcement of the statute, but as interpretations 
of it. According to Professors Abreu and Greenstein, the statutory 
definition of gross income (as glossed by Glenshaw Glass) “gives the 
IRS the flexibility to navigate the shoals of social opinion regarding 
income taxation, thereby . . . permitting the evolution of a concept of 
income that serves . . . important values in taxation,” including “a 
variety of noneconomic values.”29 This stretches beyond the breaking 
 
 26. Comm’r v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426, 431 (1955) (describing certain benefits as 
taxable because they were “accessions to wealth, clearly realized, and over which the taxpayers 
have complete dominion”). 
 27. Alice G. Abreu & Richard K. Greenstein, Defining Income, 11 FLA. TAX REV. 295 
(2011). 
 28. See id. at 333–48.  
 29. Id. at 300. 
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point the concept of what counts as an interpretation. Nothing in the 
language or legislative history of § 61, and nothing in Glenshaw Glass, 
suggests (for example) that employee-retained frequent-flier miles 
are not within the definition of gross income. Moreover, the IRS has 
never stated that frequent-flier miles are not within the scope of § 61. 
In fact, the IRS’s most significant pronouncement on the topic—its 
2002 announcement—implies the opposite when it states that “the 
IRS has not pursued a tax enforcement program” with respect to 
frequent-flier miles and notes that “[a]ny future guidance on the 
taxability of these benefits will be applied prospectively.”30 Thus, far 
from claiming that its position is an interpretation of the statute, the 
IRS acknowledges that it is not enforcing the law. 
The same is true of a number of other customary deviations. For 
example, Professors Abreu and Greenstein discuss in some detail the 
evolution of the IRS’s position on the tax treatment of unsolicited 
free samples.31 In a 1970 revenue ruling, the IRS stated that a 
newspaper’s book reviewer realized income when he received and 
retained an unsolicited new copy of a book from its publisher.32 Later 
in the same year, the IRS withdrew that ruling and replaced it with a 
much narrower ruling, holding only that the reviewer was required to 
include the value of the book in gross income if he donated the book 
to charity and claimed a deduction for the donation.33 Professors 
Abreu and Greenstein characterize the second ruling as indicating 
that an unsolicited free sample is not within the definition of gross 
income as long as the taxpayer does not claim a deduction for 
donating it to charity,34 but the ruling neither states nor implies any 
such thing. It says nothing about the taxability or nontaxability of 
taxpayer-retained free samples—and in fact the analytical portion of 
the ruling suggests that taxpayer-retained samples would be taxable.35 
Although an informed observer could reasonably conclude from the 
two 1970 revenue rulings that the IRS had decided not to enforce the 
 
 30. I.R.S. Announcement 2002-18, 2002-10 I.R.B. 621. 
 31. Abreu & Greenstein, supra note 27, at 313–19. 
 32. Rev. Rul. 70-330, 1970-1 C.B. 14.  
 33. See Rev. Rul. 70-498, 1970-2 C.B. 6 (holding that “the value of these [2,500 donated] 
books is includible in the taxpayer’s gross income”). 
 34. See Abreu & Greenstein, supra note 27, at 317–18 (describing as inconsistent with 
Revenue Ruling 70-498, 1970-2 C.B. 6, the IRS’s indication in a 2006 press release that “swag 
bags” given to presenters at the Academy Awards ceremony were includible in gross income). 
 35. See Rev. Rul. 70-498, 1970-2 C.B. 6 (“It is well established that gross income is not 
limited to cash received, but may also include the fair market value of property received.”). 
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taxability of taxpayer-retained samples, nothing in either ruling 
constitutes an IRS interpretation of the statute as not including such 
samples within the scope of gross income. 
In some cases it is debatable whether an IRS action constitutes 
interpretation or nonenforcement. One example is the 1957 ruling on 
turned-down game-show prizes, which baldly states—without the 
slightest attempt to explain or justify its conclusion—that such prizes 
are not includible in gross income.36 Rulings of this sort purport to be 
based on the statutory definition of gross income, so they are 
interpretive in a formal sense. Because of their utter failure to 
explain, however, they are interpretive only in a formal sense. In 
substance, they are no different from an IRS announcement that the 
Code says one thing, but that the IRS will administer the Code as if it 
said something else. To describe the analysis-free game-show prize 
ruling as an interpretation of the Code is to collapse a distinction 
worth maintaining, between a real—albeit aggressively protaxpayer—
interpretation (such as the proposed regulations on qualified 
accelerated death benefits) and nonenforcement masquerading as 
interpretation. 
There is one more definitional question regarding customary 
deviations. If a deviation is sufficiently open and notorious (so to 
speak) for sufficiently long, might it thereby acquire the force of law, 
in the sense that the tax administrators could not then abandon the 
deviation and begin to enforce the letter of the law? If so, then 
customary deviations have a limited lifespan as deviations from the 
law; once they have lasted long enough, they become the law. Such a 
story might be told, for example, about the nontaxation of the rental 
value of owner-occupied housing. Perhaps the tax administrators 
could have declared in the early years of the income tax that imputed 
rental value is includible in gross income, but perhaps the courts 
would not permit that today. The case law supplies no answer to the 
question of whether deviations eventually become law, for the simple 
reason that the Treasury Department and the IRS have never 
abandoned well-established customary deviations (in the absence of 
 
 36. Rev. Rul. 57-374, 1957-2 C.B. 69. For additional analysis-free rulings, see, for example, 
Revenue Ruling 81-209, 1981-2 C.B. 16, which held, without explanation, that a lawyer’s client 
does not realize gross income when interest earned on the client’s funds held in the lawyer’s 
trust account is paid to a designated tax-exempt entity pursuant to a program established by the 
state supreme court, and Revenue Ruling 63-77, 1963-1 C.B. 177, which held, also without 
explanation, that the reimbursement of the interview-travel expenses of a prospective employee 
by a prospective employer is not includible in the gross income of the prospective employee. 
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legislative change), and thus there has never been a context in which 
the question could be litigated.37 
There are a few hints in the cases that customary deviations 
might eventually acquire the force of law. In Vesco v. Commissioner,38 
the Tax Court held, despite the absence of any statutory authority for 
not including the value of free flights for family members in an 
employee’s gross income, that the taxpayer-favorable administrative 
practice of the IRS “should be applied to petitioner on the same basis 
as it is applied to other taxpayers.”39 This assumed, however, that the 
IRS would continue to apply the customary deviation to all other 
similarly situated taxpayers. The court explicitly stated that it was not 
deciding whether the IRS could have abandoned the deviation as to 
all taxpayers: “We do not here determine the validity of respondent’s 
argument if his long-standing position were changed as to all 
taxpayers.”40 
Zager v. Commissioner41 is also not quite on point on the 
question of whether customary deviations eventually acquire the 
force of law. The IRS claimed that the taxpayers realized gross 
income as a result of interest-free loans from a corporation they 
controlled.42 The IRS’s position in the litigation was contrary to a 
long-standing administrative position.43 In ruling in the taxpayers’ 
favor, the court opined that “if change is desired, a legislative solution 
would appear to be more appropriate than a judicial departure.”44 
However, the noninclusion of the value of interest-free loans had long 
been blessed by Tax Court precedent,45 so the noninclusion was not a 
 
 37. The IRS did come close once. In 1978 IRS Commissioner Jerome Kurtz indicated that, 
if Congress did not soon provide a statutory solution to the problem of taxation of a miscellany 
of employee fringe benefits, he would direct his agency to begin to enforce the full scope of § 61. 
Taxing Perks—If Congress Won’t, IRS’ Kurtz Will, FORBES, July 24, 1978, at 20. The threat was 
never carried out, however. For developments in the taxation of fringe benefits following 
Kurtz’s 1978 threat, see infra text accompanying notes 62–66.  
 38. Vesco v. Comm’r, 39 T.C.M. (CCH) 101 (1979). 
 39. Id. at 130. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Zager v. Comm’r, 72 T.C. 1009 (1979), aff’d sub nom. Martin v. Comm’r, 649 F.2d 1133 
(5th Cir. 1981). 
 42. Id. 
 43. See id. at 1012 (“[T]he Government does not dispute that its argument on the merits 
represents a change of position reflected in the administration of the tax laws.”).   
 44. Id. at 1014; see also Epstein v. Comm’r, 43 T.C.M. (CCH) 666, 667 (1982) (following 
Zager on this point); Baker v. Comm’r, 75 T.C. 166, 168–70 (1980) (same). 
 45. See Dean v. Comm’r, 35 T.C. 1083, 1090 (1961) (“We have heretofore given full force 
to interest-free loans for tax purposes, holding that they result in no interest deduction for the 
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mere administrative deviation (no matter how misguided the 
precedent). 
Of course, the absence of any cases squarely on point is a 
testament to the staying power of customary deviations. As long as 
the Treasury Department and the IRS never abandon well-
established deviations, the question of whether they have the legal 
power to do so will continue to be of only theoretical interest. 
The above discussion concerns the basic “what” of customary 
deviations. What about the “why”? A more detailed consideration of 
the “why” is provided in the next Part, which describes some of the 
highlights of the historical development of customary deviations. For 
the moment it is enough to note, as have Professors Abreu and 
Greenstein, that most customary deviations are not unprincipled 
administrative frolics.46 Rather, they are ad hoc responses to serious 
difficulties with applying the Code as written in certain situations. 
Consider (once again) the examples of frequent-flier miles and 
turned-down game-show prizes. The 2002 announcement concerning 
frequent-flier miles attributes the nonenforcement policy to 
numerous unresolved “technical and administrative 
issues . . . , including issues relating to the timing and valuation of 
income inclusions and the basis for identifying personal use benefits 
attributable to business (or official) expenditures versus those 
attributable to personal expenditures.”47 This is no mere fig leaf of an 
explanation. As commentators have pointed out, the practical 
problems of taxing frequent-flier miles are truly daunting.48 Similar 
concerns underlie a number of other customary deviations. 
The story behind the game-show revenue ruling is quite 
different; that ruling was based more on concerns about fairness than 
on concerns about administrability. It is a well-established rule that 
in-kind benefits, if includible in gross income at all, are includible at 
their fair-market value rather than at their subjective value to the 
taxpayer-recipient.49 In the case of a nontransferable benefit, this rule 
 
borrower, nor interest income to the lender. We think it to be equally true that an interest-free 
loan results in no taxable gain to the borrower . . . .” (citations omitted)). 
 46. See Abreu & Greenstein, supra note 27, at 348 (describing the IRS as “tr[ying] to reach 
the right result: a tax system that is equitable, efficient, and administrable”). 
 47. I.R.S. Announcement 2002-18, 2002-10 I.R.B. 621.  
 48. See supra note 10 and sources cited therein. 
 49. This rule is, in part, a response to the difficulty or impossibility of administering a tax 
based on subjective values. See, e.g., Rooney v. Comm’r, 88 T.C. 523, 528 (1987) (taxing barter 
income at fair-market value rather than at the lower subjective value claimed by the taxpayer); 
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leads to the possibility that the tax on the fair-market value of a prize 
could be more than the taxpayer’s subjective valuation of the prize—
in effect forcing the taxpayer to pay more (in income tax) for the 
prize than the value of the prize to the taxpayer. To avoid the 
unfairness of that result without venturing into the uncharted waters 
of subjective valuation, the IRS issued a technically insupportable 
revenue ruling allowing a game-show contestant to avoid the tax by 
declining the prize. Again, the customary deviation is not an 
administrative frolic. Rather, it is a good-faith administrative 
response to a real difficulty with strict enforcement of the Code. 
II.  A HIGHLY SELECTIVE HISTORICAL SURVEY OF CUSTOMARY 
DEVIATIONS 
From the early years of the federal income tax, most customary 
deviations have been with respect to the statutory definition of gross 
income. Sometimes by pronouncement and sometimes by inaction, 
the tax administrators have indicated that they would act as if the 
statute excluded various sorts of noncash benefits from gross income. 
Customary deviations with respect to deduction provisions are not 
unheard of (and a few important recent examples are described 
below),50 but the statutory definition of gross income remains to this 
day the most deviated-from provision. There are two explanations for 
this overrepresentation of administrative exclusions from gross 
income in the universe of customary deviations. First, following the 
statutory dictate with respect to the inclusion of noncash benefits in 
gross income is inherently challenging for the Treasury and the IRS. 
Enforcement is difficult (especially when information reporting is not 
required, as it often is not outside the employment context),51 
problems of valuation and liquidity loom large,52 and taxation of many 
in-kind benefits may be nonintuitive and objectionable in the minds 
of the general public.53 Second, and of equal importance, is the 
 
Treas. Reg. § 1.61-21(b)(1) (1989) (requiring that taxable fringe benefits be included in gross 
income at their fair-market value). 
 50. See infra notes 70–82 and accompanying text. 
 51. See RICHARD SCHMALBECK & LAWRENCE ZELENAK, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 
78 (3d ed. 2011) (describing the difficulty of enforcement where information reporting is not 
required). 
 52. See, e.g., id. at 113–14 (discussing the valuation and liquidity problems inherent in 
taxing in-kind receipts).  
 53. See, e.g., Lawrence A. Zelenak & Martin J. McMahon, Jr., Taxing Baseballs and Other 
Found Property, 84 TAX NOTES 1299, 1299–1300 (1999) (describing the strongly negative 
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difference in acceptability between administrative sins of omission 
and sins of commission. A customary deviation from the definition of 
gross income is a sin of omission, resulting in the absence of any entry 
on the return of an affected taxpayer. A customary deviation allowing 
a statutorily unauthorized deduction (or credit) is a sin of 
commission, resulting in an incorrect entry on the return of an 
affected taxpayer. In the former case, the lack of an affirmative act 
and the literal invisibility of a nonentry result in customary exclusions 
attracting much less critical attention than customary deductions (or 
credits) would attract. 
In the early decades of the income tax, fringe benefits of 
employment were an especially rich source of customary deviations 
from the statutory definition of gross income.54 Strictly speaking, 
some of these deviations were not deviations at all under the 
definition offered above,55 because they were expressed in official 
pronouncements which offered explanations for their conclusions. 
For example, in a 1920 pronouncement the Bureau of Internal 
Revenue explained that occasional “supper money” paid by an 
employer to an employee working late “is considered as being paid 
for the convenience of the employer and for that reason does not 
represent taxable income to the employee.”56 A year later, the Bureau 
ruled that gross income did not include the value of free 
transportation passes issued by a railroad to its employees and their 
families for nonbusiness use; the passes were “considered gifts and 
[so] the value thereof does not constitute taxable income to the 
employees.”57 
At least from the enlightened perspective of 2012, the rationales 
of both rulings are ludicrous. Nothing in the statutory definition of 
gross income (then or now) suggests that amounts paid “for the 
 
reaction of politicians—presumably inspired by their sense of public sentiment—to the 
possibility that a baseball fan would realize gross income from catching a valuable record-
breaking home-run baseball). 
 54. The history of the taxation of fringe benefits offered here is highly selective. More 
thorough accounts can be found in Wayne M. Gazur, Assessing Internal Revenue Code Section 
132 After Twenty Years, 25 VA. TAX REV. 977, 980–95 (2006), and in Susan R. Finneran, Fringe 
Benefits or “Condition of Employment”: Uniformity, Certainty, and Compliance, 78 NW. U. L. 
REV. 198, 223–57 (1983). 
 55. See supra text accompanying note 14. 
 56. O.D. 514, 2 C.B. 90 (1920). The ruling is unusual in its exclusion of cash; the employer’s 
direction that the cash be spent on food puts the “supper money” at the borderline of cash and 
in-kind benefits.  
 57. O.D. 946, 4 C.B. 110 (1921). 
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convenience of the employer” are for that reason outside the 
boundaries of gross income, and the idea that the railroad passes were 
gifts rather than part of an employee’s compensation package is 
simply out of touch with reality. Taxpayer-favorable positions based 
on dubious interpretations of the Code are legitimately 
distinguishable from customary deviations, but positions based on 
risible rationales shade into positions with no statutory foundation 
whatsoever, and thus into the realm of customary deviations. 
Although a few other deviations were also set forth in published 
rulings,58 for many decades the IRS’s routine administrative practice 
was not to enforce the taxation of many sorts of fringe benefits, 
despite the absence of published rulings on point. As the government 
admitted in its brief in a 1962 Supreme Court case, under the IRS’s 
administrative practice fringe benefits were “not 
generally . . . considered income to the employees even if the 
employer’s sole reason for providing them [was] to confer a benefit 
upon the employees—e.g., provision of parking facilities, medical 
services, swimming pools, libraries, courtesy discounts, etc.”59 
In an attempt to impose some order on the tax treatment of 
miscellaneous fringe benefits (that is, fringe benefits not already 
covered by a specific exclusion provision of the Code), in 1975 the 
Treasury Department issued a discussion draft of proposed 
regulations which would have provided at least a regulatory 
foundation for some of the de facto administrative exclusions, while 
putting an end to others.60 In response to criticism from all sides, the 
Treasury Department abandoned the proposal the next year.61 
Congress became involved in 1978. In July of that year, IRS 
Commissioner Jerome Kurtz took the rather remarkable step of 
warning that, unless Congress provided a statutory basis for the 
exclusion of miscellaneous fringe benefits, he would direct his agency 
 
 58. See, e.g., O. 1014, 2 C.B. 88, 89–90 (1920) (holding that employer-provided group term 
life insurance was not included in the gross income of a covered employee); Rev. Rul. 59-58, 
1959-1 C.B. 17, 18 (excluding from gross income the value of holiday hams and turkeys received 
by employees “[i]n view of the small amounts involved, and since it may reasonably be 
contended in many cases that such items constitute excludable gifts”; the latter explanation 
implied that in some cases the gift characterization would not be reasonable).  
 59. Brief for the United States at 39, Rudolph v. United States, 370 U.S. 269 (1962) (No. 
396). 
 60. See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.61-16(a), 40 Fed. Reg. 41,118, 41,119 (Sept. 5, 1975) (listing 
benefits that are included in and excluded from gross income).  
 61. Fringe Benefits: Withdrawal of Discussion Draft, 41 Fed. Reg. 56,334, 56,334 (Dec. 28, 
1976). 
ZELENAK IN PRINTER PROOF (DO NOT DELETE) 11/21/2012  4:26 PM 
844 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 62:829 
to begin enforcing the taxation of forty types of then-untaxed 
benefits.62 Perhaps not coincidentally, three months later Congress 
imposed a moratorium63 (which finally expired at the end of 1983, 
after having been twice extended)64 on any actions by the Treasury 
Department or the IRS that would alter the established nontaxation 
of fringe benefits. 
Following the expiration of the moratorium, in early 1984 the 
IRS announced that it would replace the legislative moratorium with 
a self-imposed version, but only through the end of 1984.65 Faced with 
the possibility that the Treasury Department and the IRS might soon 
begin enforcing I.R.C. § 61 as written, and perhaps weary of 
moratorium legislation, Congress finally brought order to the taxation 
of miscellaneous fringe benefits by enacting new § 132.66 The new 
provision furnished a statutory basis for most of the customary 
deviations that had been established for decades. At the same time, 
however, Congress added a specific mention of “fringe benefits” in 
§ 61(a)(1) (which lists “compensation for services” as a component of 
gross income), thus indicating that there were to be no more de facto 
administrative exclusions for fringe benefits not excluded by § 132.67 
As a result of the 1984 legislation, the incidence of customary 
deviations in the fringe-benefit context has been greatly reduced. 
(The glaring exception is the de facto exclusion of employee-retained 
frequent-flier miles, if those miles are understood as received by 
employees from their employers.)68 Deviations from § 61 remain 
 
 62. See Taxing Perks—If Congress Won’t, IRS’ Kurtz Will, supra note 37, at 20 (explaining 
that Kurtz planned to issue whatever directives were necessary to tax fringe benefits).  
 63. Act of Oct. 7, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-427, § 1, 92 Stat. 996, 996.  
 64. Act of Dec. 29, 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-167, § 1, 93 Stat. 1275, 1275; Economic Recovery 
Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, tit. VIII, § 801, 95 Stat. 172, 349. 
 65. Rev. Proc. 84-14, 1984-1 C.B. 431. 
 66. Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, div. A, tit. V, subtit. C, § 531(a), 98 
Stat. 494, 877 (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 132 (2006 & Supp. IV 2011)). 
 67. Id. § 531(c), 98 Stat. at 884 (codified at I.R.C. § 61 (2006)). 
 68. The tax administration problems presented by frequent-flier miles have much in 
common with the problems presented by the miscellaneous fringe benefits addressed by § 132. 
Why, then, did Congress also not eliminate the frequent-flier customary exclusion in the 1984 
legislation by providing a statutory basis for the exclusion? The answer seems to be that 
frequent-flier programs were too recent a phenomenon in 1984 for their customary exclusion to 
have become well established, and thus to have come to the attention of Congress. See Paul 
Grimes, Practical Traveler: Coupons and Other Bonuses for the Airborne, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 11, 
1981, § 10, at 3 (describing “bonus incentive plans based on the number of trips you take or 
miles you fly” recently introduced by many airlines).  
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significant, however, outside the employment setting; the previously 
mentioned ruling on turned-down game-show prizes is one example.69 
Two post-1984 developments involved the expansion of 
customary deviations beyond the gross-income setting. The first 
development concerned the deduction for charitable contributions. In 
the 1989 case of Hernandez v. Commissioner,70 the Supreme Court 
upheld the IRS’s position that Scientologists were not entitled to 
deduct the “fixed donations”71 charged by the Church of Scientology 
for “auditing” services, on the grounds that the “payments were part 
of a quintessential quid pro quo exchange.”72 The Court rejected the 
taxpayers’ arguments that “purely religious” benefits should be 
disregarded in the quid pro quo analysis and that the IRS 
impermissibly discriminated against Scientology by denying the 
charitable deduction to Scientologists while allowing deductions to 
members of other religions in analogous circumstances.73 Only four 
years after the Court decided Hernandez, the IRS issued an analysis-
free one-sentence revenue ruling announcing that the 1978 ruling 
denying a deduction for Scientology auditing payments was thereby 
“obsoleted,”74 implying that the IRS would no longer challenge the 
deduction claims of Scientologists. But for the Hernandez decision, 
the IRS’s new protaxpayer position might have been characterized as 
a debatable-on-the-merits interpretation of the statute, but in the 
aftermath of the Court’s authoritative interpretation of the statute the 
new position constituted a deviation—unusual for being a deviation 
from a deduction provision rather than from § 61. 
More recently, the tax administrators have announced deviations 
of great economic significance in another setting far removed from 
§ 61. Section 382 of the Code imposes strict limits on the deductibility 
 
 69. See Rev. Rul. 57-374, 1957-2 C.B. 69 (stating that when an individual refuses to accept 
an all-expense-paid vacation, the value of the trip is not included in gross income); see also, e.g., 
Rev. Rul. 81-209, 1981-2 C.B. 16, 17 (holding that a lawyer’s client does not realize gross income 
when interest earned on the client’s funds held in the lawyer’s trust account is paid to a 
designated tax-exempt entity pursuant to a program established by the state supreme court); 
Rev. Rul. 63-177, 1963-1 C.B. 177, 178 (holding that a prospective employer’s reimbursements 
to individuals for interview expenses are not includible in gross income). All three rulings are 
still in force.  
 70. Hernandez v. Comm’r, 490 U.S. 680 (1989). 
 71. Id. at 685. 
 72. Id. at 691.  
 73. See id. at 689–94 (discussing quid pro quo); id. at 700–03 (discussing disparate 
treatment).  
 74. Rev. Rul. 93-73, 1993-2 C.B. 75.  
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of corporate net-operating-loss carryforwards and of unrealized built-
in losses, following either an acquisition of a loss corporation by 
another corporation or a major change in the ownership of a loss 
corporation. In September 2008, as Congress was considering a 
massive bailout bill for the financial industry, the IRS of the Bush 
administration made its own contribution to the bailout effort by 
issuing Notice 2008-83,75 declaring—without making any attempt to 
explain or justify its conclusion—that the § 382 limitations on the use 
of built-in losses following an ownership change would no longer 
apply to banks.76 The primary purpose of the notice appears to have 
been the facilitation of the acquisition of failing Wachovia—by Wells 
Fargo, as it turned out. Although the notice generated considerable 
outrage in the media, among tax experts, and on Capitol Hill,77 it 
achieved the desired result. Early in 2009, Congress took the highly 
unusual step of enacting legislation specifically disapproving of Notice 
2008-83 as “inconsistent with the congressional intent” and describing 
the legal authority for the notice as “doubtful.”78 The legislation, 
however, also declared that taxpayers could rely on the notice with 
respect to ownership changes occurring before January 17, 2009.79 
The Obama administration followed the Bush-era precedent, 
thus making protaxpayer administrative revisions of § 382 a 
bipartisan activity. The Obama-era IRS issued several § 382 notices of 
its own, including, most prominently, Notice 2010-2,80 which 
declared—again, without apparent support from the statute—that 
§ 382 would not be triggered if the Treasury Department were to sell 
its shares of General Motors to the public.81 Although the notice 
attracted some sharp criticism,82 it remains in effect. 
 
 75. I.R.S. Notice 2008-83, 2008-2 C.B. 905. 
 76. Id. 
 77. For a review of some of the reactions to the notice, see Lawrence Zelenak, Can 
Obama’s IRS Retroactively Revoke Massive Bank Giveaway?, 122 TAX NOTES 889, 889–93 
(2009).  
 78. American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, div. B, tit. I, 
subtit. C, pt. VII, § 1261(a)(2)–(3), 123 Stat. 115, 343. 
 79. Id. § 1261(b)(1)(A), 123 Stat. at 343. 
 80. I.R.S. Notice 2010-2, 2010-1 C.B. 251. 
 81. Id. at 252. The notice did not mention General Motors by name. 
 82. See, e.g., J. Mark Ramseyer & Eric B. Rasmusen, Can the Treasury Exempt Its Own 
Companies from Tax? The $45 Billion GM NOL Carryforward, 1 CATO PAPERS ON PUB. POL’Y 
1, 5 (2011) (characterizing the ruling as an unauthorized gift from the Obama administration to 
the United Auto Workers).  
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The recent § 382 notices should be troubling to anyone who 
values the application of the rule of law to tax administration. One 
can only speculate, but it is plausible that the § 382 notices never 
would have been issued but for the precedent of the § 61 customary 
deviations. Although the § 61 deviations are considerably easier to 
defend on the merits than the § 382 notices, both the Bush and 
Obama administrations may have taken the § 61 deviations to stand 
for the proposition that the Treasury Department and the IRS are 
always free to disregard the dictates of the Internal Revenue Code, as 
long as they do so in a taxpayer-favorable direction. 
Whether it is possible to combine the genuine administrative 
advantages of the restrained use of customary deviations with respect 
for the rule of law is considered in the next section. 
III.  THE ABSENCE OF THIRD-PARTY STANDING, THE SURVIVAL OF 
CUSTOMARY DEVIATIONS, THE RULE OF LAW, AND A DIFFERENT 
APPROACH 
When the IRS signals that it is not going to enforce the 
provisions of the Internal Revenue Code in a particular context—be 
it employee-retained frequent-flier miles or Wells Fargo’s acquisition 
of Wachovia’s built-in losses—there is usually no lack of good-
government sorts who are offended by the IRS’s position and who 
would be only too happy to challenge that position in court on behalf 
of the public.83 Intermeddling law professors alone (possibly including 
this one) would be sufficient to challenge most of the more significant 
customary deviations. Very few such suits are brought, however, and 
none succeed, because the law of standing does not permit self-
appointed guardians of the public interest to challenge the IRS’s 
unduly lenient treatment of other taxpayers. Concurring in 1976 in a 
leading case rejecting a claim of third-party standing, Justice Stewart 
remarked that he could not “imagine a case, at least outside the First 
Amendment area, where a person whose own tax liability was not 
affected ever could have standing to litigate the federal tax liability of 
someone else.”84  
 
 83. For expressions of dissatisfaction with those particular nonenforcement decisions, see 
Dodge, supra note 10, at 1301; Ramseyer & Rasmusen supra note 82, at 5; Zelenak, supra note 
77, at 889. 
 84. Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 46 (1976) (Stewart, J., concurring). 
For additional examples of the Supreme Court denying third-party standing in tax cases, see 
Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 740 (1984), which involved a third-party challenge to federal 
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It is conceivable that a taxpayer whose own tax liability was at 
issue—and who thus clearly had standing—would want to challenge a 
generally taxpayer-favorable administrative deviation from the 
statute.85 Suppose, for example, a book reviewer receives free review 
copies from publishers in year one, and (in keeping with the IRS’s 
well-established nonenforcement policy with respect to unsolicited 
books not later claimed as charitable deductions)86 does not include 
the value of the books in his gross income on his income tax return 
for year one. In year five the reviewer sells the copies for some 
nontrivial amount. He reports no gain on the sale, claiming he has a 
basis in the books equal to the value he should have reported on his 
return for year one—a year which is now, conveniently enough, 
 
income tax exemptions for racially segregated schools, and DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 
U.S. 332, 340–46 (2006), which involved third-party challenges in federal court to state and local 
tax breaks.  
  As hinted at by Justice Stewart, special considerations apply in the First Amendment 
context. Under Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968), one’s status as a taxpayer gives one standing 
to challenge government expenditures benefitting religion as violations of the Establishment 
Clause, id. at 88. Thus, under Flast one taxpayer might have had standing to challenge 
statutorily unauthorized favorable IRS treatment of another taxpayer as a violation of the First 
Amendment. At its broadest, this was a very narrow exception to the no-third-party-tax-
standing rule, but two recent Supreme Court decisions have narrowed Flast to the point of 
nonexistence in this context. In Hein v. Freedom from Religion Foundation, 551 U.S. 587 (2007), 
the Court declined to “lower[] the taxpayer standing bar to permit challenges of purely 
executive actions,” id. at 611. In the immediate aftermath of Hein, it appeared that a taxpayer 
would have standing to challenge the First Amendment acceptability of the statutory treatment 
of another taxpayer, but not to challenge the favorable administrative treatment (in 
contravention of the statute) of another taxpayer. Hein alone would have been sufficient to 
deny Flast standing in any suit challenging the constitutionality of a customary deviation from 
the Code. The Court limited Flast again in Arizona Christian School Tuition Organization v. 
Winn, 131 S. Ct. 1436, 1440 (2011), in which the Court held that tax credits (under the Arizona 
state income tax) did not count as government spending, and so could not be challenged by a 
third party claiming standing under Flast. Even apart from Hein, Arizona Christian School 
Tuition Organization would be sufficient to deny standing to taxpayers challenging the 
constitutionality of favorable IRS treatment of other taxpayers. Thus, the sort of third-party 
standing hinted at by Justice Stewart in First Amendment cases now appears to be doubly 
foreclosed. 
 85. See Gregg D. Polsky, Can Treasury Overrule the Supreme Court?, 84 B.U. L. REV. 185, 
239–43 (2004) (hypothesizing a number of situations in which taxpayers might be motivated to 
challenge the validity of the so-called “check-the-box” regulations governing tax classification of 
entities as partnerships or corporations, despite the generally taxpayer-favorable character of 
the regulations). 
 86. See supra notes 32–34 and accompanying text. As explained in that text, the 
nonenforcement policy may be implied by Revenue Ruling 70-498, 1970-2 C.B. 6, when read in 
the context of the earlier ruling it replaced, but the IRS has never formally stated this 
nonenforcement policy. 
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closed by the three-year statute of limitations.87 His argument is that, 
although his failure to report the value of the books in year one was 
consistent with the IRS’s customary deviation from the statute, the 
customary deviation is itself without legal foundation.88 
The attractiveness to taxpayers of this sort of scheme is severely 
curtailed by §§ 1311 through 1314 of the Code, which provide for 
“mitigation” of the statute of limitations in various situations in which 
the taxpayer (or the IRS) takes a position on the tax treatment of a 
transaction in an open year that is inconsistent with the treatment of a 
related transaction in a year now closed by the statute of limitations.89 
In situations such as the example—in which a taxpayer claims basis 
on account of an amount he should have included in gross income in a 
closed year—the taxpayer is allowed the claimed basis if the 
taxpayer’s position is substantively correct, but the IRS is allowed to 
assess and collect the additional earlier-year tax that would be 
produced by the inclusion in that year, despite the fact that the earlier 
year is otherwise closed.90 
Although the mitigation provisions very often eliminate the 
incentive for taxpayers to challenge protaxpayer customary 
deviations in closed years to gain an advantage in later open years, 
this will not always be the case. In the book-reviewer example, if the 
applicable tax rate in the later year is higher than the applicable tax 
rate in the earlier year, then the benefit of the additional basis in the 
later year will be greater than the cost of the inclusion in the earlier 
year. The reviewer would then have motivation to challenge the 
protaxpayer customary deviation in the earlier year, despite the fact 
that a successful challenge would bring into play the mitigation 
provisions. 
Despite the theoretical possibility that a taxpayer could have 
motivation—and standing—to challenge the application to himself of 
a taxpayer-favorable customary deviation, in practice such litigation is 
 
 87. See I.R.C. § 6501(a) (Supp. IV 2011) (providing for a three-year statute of limitations).  
 88. For an unsuccessful taxpayer effort along similar lines, see Woodsam Associates v. 
Commissioner, 198 F.2d 357, 359 (2d Cir. 1952). In keeping with the long-standing IRS 
interpretation of the statute—not a mere customary deviation—the taxpayer did not treat 
nonrecourse borrowing against unrealized appreciation as a taxable event; in a later year, 
however, the taxpayer claimed an increase in the basis of the mortgaged property on the 
grounds that the borrowing was, in fact, a taxable event. Id. at 359. 
 89. I.R.C. §§ 1311–1314 (2006). 
 90. See id. § 1312(7) (including situations of this sort in the list of circumstances giving rise 
to mitigating adjustments under § 1311). 
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vanishingly rare.91 As a result, the prospect of such litigation has had 
no discernible braking effect on the IRS’s customary-deviation 
practices.92 
This Essay does not attempt to set forth a full-blown argument 
that customary deviations are often appropriate or even necessary 
administrative responses to the severe difficulties that would arise if 
the IRS insisted on enforcing the full letter of the law in all 
situations—although even my brief descriptions of the frequent-flier 
mile and game-show prize issues may be enough to make the point in 
a nonrigorous sort of way.93 If the point is accepted, however, it 
follows that the denial of third-party standing in tax cases is a very 
good thing. After all, customary deviations could not survive in their 
current form under a legal regime which conferred standing upon any 
third party objecting to a customary deviation benefitting other 
taxpayers.94 The IRS could not, for example, suggest that employee-
retained frequent-flier miles are includible in gross income under the 
terms of § 61, but then indicate that it is going to act as if they were 
not, and signal to taxpayers with a wink and a nod that taxpayers 
should follow the IRS’s lead. Similarly, the IRS could not simply 
announce—without making any attempt to reconcile its 
announcement with the dictates of the statute—that it was going to 
administer the § 382 restrictions on trafficking in tax losses as if that 
provision contained exceptions for Wells Fargo and General Motors. 
 
 91. Woodsam is one of the few cases that might be cited as such a challenge. See Woodsam, 
198 F.2d at 358–59. Strictly speaking, however, even it is not such a challenge because the 
challenged protaxpayer treatment was not, in fact, a deviation from the statute. See id. at 359 
(holding that the taxpayer’s borrowings “did not change the basis for the computation of gain or 
loss”). 
 92. Even if a taxpayer were to mount a successful challenge to a particular deviation, the 
litigation would likely have little or no effect on the application of the challenged deviation to 
other taxpayers. If the IRS prefers not to enforce the law on the books in a particular context, 
the mere existence of a judicial opinion (even if it is from the Supreme Court) does not compel 
the IRS to abandon its nonenforcement policy with respect to any taxpayer other than the 
taxpayer involved in the litigation. As always, the absence of third-party standing leaves the IRS 
free to pursue a policy of nonenforcement. And because the effect of the nonenforcement 
policy is overwhelmingly taxpayer favorable, other taxpayers will not be lining up to take 
advantage of the judicial precedent. 
 93. For a much more ambitious—and largely successful—defense of the IRS practice of 
often ignoring the letter of the law with respect to the inclusion of in-kind benefits in gross 
income, see Abreu & Greenstein, supra note 27, at 299. 
 94. See Polsky, supra note 85, at 245 (remarking, after arguing against the validity of the 
generally taxpayer-favorable check-the-box entity classification regulations, “[i]t is likely that 
the restrictive taxpayer standing doctrine plays a role in the Treasury’s issuance of these invalid 
rules”). 
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Nor could the IRS make stick its analysis-free revenue rulings holding 
that various items—turned-down game-show prizes, for example—
are not includible in gross income. In all these situations, if third-
party standing existed courts would likely feel compelled to apply the 
Code as written, giving little or no weight to the various “soft” policy 
arguments in favor of the deviations. 
Although the denial of third-party standing gives the Treasury 
Department and the IRS the flexibility they arguably need, it creates 
serious rule-of-law problems. To anyone who takes the rule of law 
seriously, it is troubling to contemplate that the Treasury and the IRS 
are almost unconstrained in their ability to make de facto revisions to 
the Internal Revenue Code enacted by Congress, as long as those 
revisions are in a taxpayer-favorable direction. It is especially 
troubling to think that the relatively innocent customary deviations in 
the gross income context may have bred a disrespect for the rule of 
law on the part of the Treasury and the IRS, so that tax 
administrators now believe they have the power and the authority to 
disregard any Code section when doing so would further their notion 
(not Congress’s notion) of good tax policy. The recent selective 
disregardings of § 382 by the Bush and Obama administrations are 
bad enough from a rule-of-law perspective,95 and may be signs of even 
worse to come. It may seem, then, that the choice is between the 
unsatisfactory alternatives of a system that denies crucial flexibility to 
tax administrators or a system that fosters a deep disrespect for the 
rule of law. 
But there may be a way to preserve needed administrative 
flexibility while paying more respect to rule-of-law concerns. 
 
 95. Professors Mark Ramseyer and Eric Rasmusen are particularly scathing on the rule-of-
law implications of the 2010 notice declaring (to oversimplify a bit) that § 382 did not apply to 
General Motors. According to them, there would have been no substantive difference between 
the actual notice and a more honest hypothetical alternative stating that President Obama “is 
grateful to the UAW for the assistance it provided his party,” and that “[i]n gratitude for that 
political support, the Treasury announces that” § 382 does not apply to General Motors. 
Ramseyer & Rasmusen, supra note 82, at 30.  
  In response to what they view as the scandal of the § 382 notices, Ramseyer and 
Rasmusen propose a statute giving any two members of Congress standing to challenge any 
taxpayer-favorable “arbitrary and capricious” tax administrative position, with the “arbitrary 
and capricious” standard satisfied when the “statute is unambiguously contrary to the Treasury 
position.” Id. at 37. The proposal has considerable merit in the context of the § 382 notices, but 
Ramseyer and Rasmusen do not consider its impact outside of that context. Their proposal 
would grant any two members of Congress standing to challenge (for example) the IRS 
announcement that it would not enforce the taxation of frequent-flier miles, thereby denying 
the IRS flexibility which is arguably appropriate or even crucial in that context.  
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Congress, the Treasury Department, and the IRS could take steps to 
preserve the ability of tax administrators to deviate from strict 
adherence to the statute in situations in which deviations are a 
reasonable response to concerns of administrability—broadly defined 
to include, among other things, problems of valuation, liquidity, 
timing, enforcement, and public understanding and acceptance. Given 
that the large majority of customary deviations involve the 
noninclusion in gross income of various types of nonemployee non-
cash benefits, perhaps the best approach would be for Congress to 
enact a new Code provision specifically authorizing the Treasury 
Department to issue regulations narrowing the statutory definition of 
gross income with respect to non-cash benefits received outside of an 
employment context, whenever the IRS decides that administrative 
concerns make such a narrowing advisable.96 If this approach worked 
well in the gross-income context, Congress might decide to give the 
Treasury Department similar authority to revise by regulation other 
specified Code sections—although it is hard to imagine that Congress 
would ever decide that it was appropriate (for example) to give 
Treasury the authority to “turn off” § 382 for certain taxpayers. 
Armed with an explicit grant of authority, the Treasury 
Department could replace its unacknowledged deviations, its 
announcements that it will not enforce the law, and its analysis-free 
revenue rulings with what would then be clearly authorized 
regulations narrowing the scope of gross income—and perhaps other 
clearly authorized regulations revising other Code sections pursuant 
to other express grants of authority. Needed administrative flexibility 
would be maintained, and respect for the rule of law would be 
enhanced. No longer would a de facto administrative exclusion for 
frequent-flier miles foster an administrative mindset in which the 
Treasury Department feels free to issue notices conferring billions of 
dollars of unauthorized tax benefits on a small number of clearly 
identifiable taxpayers. 
 
 96. Such a provision would not unambiguously confer on the Treasury Department 
authority to issue regulations excluding from gross income employee-retained frequent-flier 
miles, since the miles are at least arguably received by employees from their employers (on the 
view that there is a constructive transfer of the miles from employer to employee when the 
employer allows the employee to retain the miles rather than declining them or turning them 
over to the employer). In any event, the question of the tax status of frequent-flier miles is 
sufficiently high profile and of sufficient economic importance that Congress should probably 
resolve it by statute (following the 1984 precedent of the miscellaneous fringe benefit rules, see 
supra notes 65–66 and accompanying text) rather than leaving it to administrative discretion.  
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An alternative approach, suggested by Commissioner Kurtz’s 
1978 threat to start enforcing the letter of the law with respect to 
fringe benefits,97 would be for the tax administrators to notify 
Congress that a statutorily unauthorized customary deviation has 
been identified, and that unless Congress quickly provides a statutory 
foundation for the current practice, the administrators intend to end 
the deviation and start enforcing the law on the books at a specified 
date in the fairly near future. Even if this game of chicken happened 
to work in the case of Kurtz’s threat,98 it is not satisfactory as a general 
solution. First, it could never be truly institutionalized, because each 
succeeding administration would be free to use or not use this 
approach. Second, in many cases a reasonable date to begin enforcing 
the law on the books would be after the departure of the current 
administration, in which case the threat could not credibly be made. 
Third, if the reason for the existence of the deviation is the extreme 
unworkability of strict enforcement (as is arguably the case with 
frequent-flier miles), then the threat of full enforcement might not be 
credible even apart from concerns about the life expectancy of the 
current administration. Finally, even if the threat is credible, the 
political barriers to the enactment of tax legislation—even of 
noncontroversial provisions—are sometimes so high that the threat 
may fail to produce a legislative solution despite overwhelming 
congressional sentiment in favor of a solution. Because none of these 
objections apply to the alternative approach of a statutory grant of 
authority to the Treasury Department to issue deviating regulations, 
the statutory authority approach is preferable to the game-of-chicken 
strategy. 
CONCLUSION 
Customary deviations from the statute in the administration of 
the federal income tax have existed almost as long as there has been a 
federal income tax. Especially in the administration of the definition 
of gross income, there are strong arguments of administrative 
convenience—or even necessity—in favor of many of the deviations. 
Although such deviations have always been in tension with the rule of 
law, that tension may have been tolerable as long as tax 
 
 97. Taxing Perks—If Congress Won’t, IRS’ Kurtz Will, supra note 37, at 20. 
 98. The enactment of § 132 followed six years after the threat. Deficit Reduction Act of 
1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 531(a), div. A, tit. V, subtit. C, 98 Stat. 494, 877 (codified as amended 
at I.R.C. § 132 (2006 & Supp. IV 2011)). But it is not clear that the threat caused the enactment.  
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administrators exercised self-restraint in their use of customary 
deviations. The recent bipartisan extension of deviations to the loss-
trafficking context suggests a serious eroding of administrative self-
restraint and a greater threat to the rule of law. The time may have 
come for Congress to intervene by providing explicit statutory 
authorization for some deviations (primarily or exclusively deviations 
relating to the definition of gross income) while making clear the 
unacceptability of deviations in other contexts. 
It is a commonplace that nonenforcement (or severe 
underenforcement) of one law may breed among the citizenry a 
general disrespect for the law. That was, for example, one of the 
standard critiques of the underenforcement of Prohibition laws,99 and 
it is today a common Tea Party critique of the Obama 
administration’s allegedly lax enforcement of the immigration laws.100 
This is also a concern in the tax context; for example, the ability of 
tipped workers to avoid paying tax on a substantial portion of their 
tips may contribute to a general decline in voluntary compliance.101 
The customary deviations discussed in this Essay, however, raise 
a different concern. Because the taxpaying public may not understand 
that customary deviations are contrary to law—for example, most 
taxpayers may assume that the Code excludes frequent-flier miles 
from gross income—customary deviations may do little or nothing to 
foster a general disrespect for the income tax among the citizenry. 
The mischief of customary deviations is in their effect on the tax 
administrators. As the example of the recent § 382 announcements 
suggests, customary deviations may have contributed to an 
insufficient respect for the dictates of the Code on the part of high-
level Treasury Department and IRS officials. Although this Essay has 
considered only customary deviations in the administration of the 
federal income tax, scholars of other federal agencies—the SEC and 
the EPA come readily to mind—might profitably investigate whether 
 
 99. See, e.g., DANIEL OKRENT, LAST CALL: THE RISE AND FALL OF PROHIBITION 316 
(2010) (describing and quoting President Herbert Hoover’s inaugural address, in which Hoover 
stated that underenforcement of Prohibition laws by state and local authorities was 
“destroy[ing] respect for all law”). 
 100. See, e.g., Alberto R. Gonzales, “Anchor Babies” Aren’t the Problem with Immigration, 
WASH. POST, Aug. 22, 2010, at B2 (claiming that the Obama administration had failed to 
enforce the immigration laws and that this failure “breeds . . . disrespect for the rule of law”). 
 101. See, e.g., SCHMALBECK & ZELENAK, supra note 51, at 52 (“[T]he existence of 
unenforced rules may foster a general disrespect for the tax system, and thus encourage 
cheating not only with respect to tips but whenever cheating is not likely to be detected.”). 
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customary deviations play a similar role—and raise similar 
concerns—in the practices of those agencies. 
 
